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Heuristics and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges
by

J EFFREY J. R ACHLINSKI , C HRIS G UTHRIE ,

AND

A NDREW J. W ISTRICH

“Specialization is for insects.”
Robert A. HEINLEIN [1973, p. 248]
Do specialized judges make better decisions than judges who are generalists? Specialized judges surely come to know their area of law well, but specialization
might also allow judges to develop better, more reliable ways of assessing cases.
We assessed this question by presenting a group of specialized judges with a set
of hypothetical cases designed to elicit a reliance on common heuristics that can
lead judges to make poor decisions. Although the judges resisted the influence of
some of these heuristics, they also expressed a clear vulnerability to others. These
results suggest that specialization does not produce better judgment. (JEL: K 35,
K 41)

1 Introduction
Judging is becoming an increasingly difficult profession. Legal systems everywhere
continuously grow more complex, even as judicial caseloads, at least in the United
States, also expand. Federal judges in the United States now manage an average
of over 390 cases on their dockets (MECHAM [2005, p. 9, Table 3]). This caseload
means that a judge who works 2000 hours each year on directly deciding cases
would spend only five hours per year on each case. This is barely enough time to
read the memoranda supporting motions in a complex case, or to preside over jury
selection in a jury trial.
Given the increasing complexity and time pressure that judges face, it is perhaps
no surprise that specialization is a steadily growing trend, at least in the United States
(AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE
(CEELI) [1996]). The federal system in the United States now has specialized
courts for claims involving taxes, patents, and bankruptcy proceedings. Many federal
administrative law judges also specialize in particular areas of law, such as social
security administration, securities regulation, or veteran’s affairs. Many states have
their own specialized courts as well, each with their own unique areas of law, such
as water rights, environmental claims, land claims, claims involving state and local
government law, or certain drug offences (AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTRAL
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
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AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE (CEELI) [1996]). Virtually all states have
courts devoted to handle family law matters, probate claims, and juvenile offenders
(although many state judges cycle through each of these departments).
Specialization might enable judges to master an area of law more thoroughly
and to therefore use their time more effectively. Few would doubt that specialized judges can learn more about their subject than a generalist judge or that
a knowledgeable judge is, other things being equal, a better judge. Specialists
can also devote all of their time to the particular area of law, read journals devoted to that specialty, and attend educational conferences in that area. They can
also be recruited from the ranks of those lawyers who have practiced in the specialty. Specialists will see the same issues repeatedly, ensuring that areas of the law
that might seem complex the first time through become familiar to the specialist
judge.
Specialist judges’ repeated exposure to the same issues might also produce some
unexpected consequences. Repeated exposure to the same problems might allow
judges to learn how to make better decisions. Judges, like most adults, rely on simple decision rules, or heuristics, to make decisions (GUTHRIE , RACHLINSKI, AND
WISTRICH [2001]). These heuristics can be useful, but can also lead to oversimplification and error (KAHNEMAN AND TVERSKY [1974]). Generalist judges might not
be able to develop good heuristics, because they lack the repeated exposure to the
same problem that can allow people to develop useful rules of thumb.
Expertise does not consistently produce better judgment, however. Experts often
rely on the same common mental shortcuts to make decisions as laypersons, even
when doing so leads them to make poor judgments. “Several studies have found
that experts display either roughly the same biases as college students or the same
biases at somewhat reduced levels” (PLOUS [1993, p. 258]). For example, doctors
(ARKES et al. [1981]), clinical psychologists (ARKES et al. [1988]), and auditors
(ANDERSON, LOWE, AND RECKERS [1993]), rely on mental processes that produce
the hindsight bias. Clinical psychologists also discount base rate evidence in their
diagnoses and suffer from related errors in judgment (CHAPMAN AND CHAPMAN
[1969], TVERSKY AND KAHNEMAN [1971]). Real estate agents fall prey to anchoring
when estimating real estate prices (NORTHCRAFT AND NEALE [1987]). Doctors
and lawyers suffer from framing effects (BABCOCK et al. [1995], MCNEIL et al.
[1982]). Many factors might account for experts’ reliance on faulty mental processes.
Notably, experts often lack the feedback necessary to learn how to make better
decisions.
Experts sometimes learn to make better judgments than laypersons, however
(HEATH, LARRICK , AND KLAYMAN [1998]). Typically, superior judgment among
experts arises from their reliance on a professional norm concerning how to make
judgments, rather than from their repeated experience with the decision itself. For
example, civil engineers learn to add an allowance for structural safety beyond that
which their own judgment would suggest is necessary (HEATH, LARRICK , AND
KLAYMAN [1998]). This norm counteracts the overconfidence and lack of foresight
that is common to many professionals that would otherwise lead to many structural
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failures. It is not so much that the expert’s judgment is better than a layperson’s
judgment, but rather, experts rely less on their own judgment and more on their
training.
As to judges, our own previous research demonstrates that judges rely on misleading heuristics in some circumstances (GUTHRIE , RACHLINSKI, AND WISTRICH
[2001]). Specifically, we have found that judges: rely on misleading numeric anchors
when assessing damage awards; are sensitive to the presentation of a settlement as
a gain or as a loss; are prone to the hindsight bias in assessing the potential outcome
on appeal; inappropriately disregard base rate information relevant to negligence
decisions; and suffer from self-serving bias in assessing their own likelihood of
being overturned on appeal. Our research suggests that generalist judges often
make the same kinds of mistakes as the rest of us when making judgments and
decisions.
But our previous research has been conducted entirely on generalist judges. What
about specialized judges? The only other study of specialty judges revealed that
bankruptcy judges suffer from at least one common error in judgment – the egocentric, or self-serving, bias – that has also been shown to influence generalist judges.
Theodore Eisenberg found that bankruptcy judges rated themselves as more prompt
and efficient than did the lawyers who appear in front of them, even on issues that
would seem subject to objective evaluation (EISENBERG [1994]). It could be that
judges were accurate, and the lawyers simply underestimated their abilities, but
it seems likely that bankruptcy judges suffer from the common tendency to see
themselves in a better light than is actually the case.
In this paper we discuss further empirical research on the decision making of one
particular type of expert judges: namely, bankruptcy judges in the United States. In
our study, we assess whether the bankruptcy judges rely on of the same kinds of
cognitive process that we have observed in other judges, as well as assess the role
of other kinds of potentially misleading information in these judges.

2 The Study
2.1 The Participating Judges
We recruited a total of 113 sitting bankruptcy judges attending a judicial education
conference in Seattle, Washington, on August 9, 2004, to participate in our study.1
The conference was the annual judicial education conference for United States
bankruptcy judges organized by the Federal Judicial Center. These judges came
from all across the United States. At the conference itself, we presented a panel,
entitled, “The Psychology of Judging.” Judges at the conference had the option of
attending our panel or one of two other competing panels held concurrently. We do
not know what percentage of judges attending the conference chose our panel, but
1 The results of this study are also reported, in greater detail in RACHLINSKI ,
GUTHRIE, AND WISTRICH [2007].
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we do know that the 113 judges in attendance constituted 36.1% (113 out of 313,
see MECHAM [2004, p. 24, Table 13]) percent of all bankruptcy judges serving at
the time of the conference.
The federal bankruptcy judges are a particular type of specialized judge, with
notable characteristics. The bankruptcy judges are appointed by merit-selection
panels within each federal judicial circuit, and serve 14-year renewable terms
(28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1)). The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts is largely limited
to bankruptcy matters. All bankruptcy matters are assigned initially to a bankruptcy
judge. Hence, these judges do not preside over criminal matters, but in unusual
cases, they can preside over civil trials, when doing so is closely related to the
adjudication of a bankruptcy claim (28 U.S.C. § 157). Appeals from bankruptcy
judges run directly to the trial courts, rather than to the appellate courts (28 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)). The bankruptcy courts have an extremely heavy caseload, as slightly more
than 300 judges faced over 1.8 million open cases in 2005 (MECHAM [2005, p. 19,
Table 7]).
We did not ask the judges to identify themselves by name, but we did ask them
to identify their gender, number of years of experience on the bench, and which
political party with which they most closely identified. In our sample, 26.7% (30 out
of 1122 ) of the judges were women. As to political party, 76.6% (82 out of 107) selfidentified as Democrats and 23.4% (25 out of 107) self-identified as Republicans.
The bankruptcy judges in our sample reported that they had, on average, 11 years
of experience. They ranged from brand new judges to judges with 28 years of
experience; the median level of experience was 10 years.
2.2 The Procedure
At the conference we distributed our questionnaires to the judges in person before
our presentation. We asked the judges to read and respond to each of the questions
and to do so independently. At the beginning of the session, one of us (Wistrich)
introduced himself, and asked the judges to read and respond to the questionnaire in
front of them. He requested that they do so quietly, assured them that we were not
collecting their names or other identifying information, and informed them that we
would score the results and present them back to them at the end of the session. The
judges appeared to take the questionnaires seriously; as the room was silent during
the administration of the questionnaires.
Because we did not ask the judges to identify themselves, all responses were
anonymous. We also informed the judges that participation in the survey was entirely
voluntary. The final page of the questionnaires gave the judges the opportunity to
limit the use of their answers to discussion during their particular conference, thereby
excluding them from discussion in other contexts and from use in any publication.
One judge (out of the 114 judges who received the survey) exercised this option and
results from this judge are not included in our analysis.
2

Not all of the 113 judges in our sample answered all of the demographic questions.
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2.3 The Materials
We gave each of the bankruptcy judges a questionnaire that included five hypothetical cases. The first four hypothetical questions assessed the influence of anchoring, framing, the omission bias, and the effect of the race of a debtor, while
a fifth hypothetical tested for the effect of apologies and of terror management.3
We explain each of these phenomena below, along with the results. We also assessed the influence of experience, political party, and gender of the judges on their
decisions.
3 Results
3.1 Anchoring
When people make numeric estimates (e.g., the fair market value of a house), they
commonly rely on the initial value available to them (e.g., the list price). That
initial value tends to “anchor” their final estimates (see KAHNEMAN AND TVERSKY
[1974]). Reliance on an anchor is often reasonable because many anchors convey
relevant information about the actual value of an item. Anchors also influence
judgment when they clearly convey no useful information, however. In one early
study of anchoring, for instance, Professors Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
asked participants to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United
Nations. Before asking for this estimate, they informed the participants that the
number was either higher or lower than a numerical value identified by the spin
of a “wheel of fortune.” Tversky and Kahneman had secretly rigged this “wheel
of fortune” to stop either on 10 or 65. When the wheel landed on 10, participants
provided a median estimate of 25%; when the wheel landed on 65, participants
provided a median estimate of 45%. Even though the initial values were clearly
irrelevant to the decision task, they had a pronounced impact on the participants’
responses.
To test for the influence of anchoring on bankruptcy judges, we constructed
a problem in which judges had to set an interest rate on a restructured loan.
In creating the problem, we took advantage of a recent United States Supreme
Court opinion, Till v. SCS Credit.4 The case required that the Supreme Court determine the method bankruptcy courts must use for setting the interest rate for
a secured loan in certain bankruptcy proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded
that the appropriate method for calculating a new interest rate in these proceedings should consist of the prime lending rate, plus some amount designed to
reflect the slightly greater risk of default the debtor presents, relative to large
commercial creditors. In so concluding, the court determined that the loan’s ori3 The order in which we present the phenomena here is not the same as the order in
which the judges evaluated the materials. The judges saw the hypothetical questions in
the following order: anchoring, race, omission bias, framing, and apology/terror management.
4 We thank Professor Douglas Baird for suggesting this problem.
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ginal interest rate (before the bankruptcy filing) has no direct relevance to the final
rate.
To test whether anchoring has an effect on bankruptcy judges, we drafted materials
that presented the same assessment present in Till.5 The original interest rate is not
part of the calculus the Supreme Court articulated. Hence, we reasoned that any
effect that the original rate might have on the judges’ assessment of the appropriate
interest rate would reflect the influence anchoring. Half of the judges in our study
simply determined an appropriate interest rate, given the facts we provided. For
these judges, the materials noted that, “The parties agree that under Till, the original
contract interest rate is irrelevant to the court’s determination.” The other half
received the same sentence, except that the words “of 21%” were included between
the words “rate” and “is irrelevant.” Thus, half of the judges were provided no
interest rate and the other half were provided with an interest rate.
The interest rate affected the judges’ assessments. The mean interest rate set by
the 54 judges who did not know the original rate was 6.33% while the mean interest
rate set by the 49 judges who were told that the original interest rate was 21%
was 7.13%.6 The difference between the two groups was marginally statistically
significant (t(101) = 1.86, p = 0.066).7 Thus, the judges seemed to be affected by
the irrelevant numeric anchor.
To be sure, judges might have found the high interest rate informative, even apart
from its effect as an anchor. The rate was fairly high and as such, might have signaled
to the judges that the debtor posed a significant risk of default. Our materials were
sparse, so this might have been an important clue for the judges as to the risk of
further default. We think this account unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, as
the Supreme Court noted in Till, and bankruptcy judges surely know, the risk of
default after the debtor has filed in Chapter 13 is apt to be very different from the
risk of default when the loan was initiated. The debtor has resolved many unsecured
debts through the bankruptcy filing, has offered a plan designed to achieve solvency
that has been approved by a bankruptcy judge, and remains under the supervision of
the bankruptcy court. Second, our materials note some changed circumstance from
the time of the loan. Even though we gave them few facts, the judges would have
had to assess the risk of default under very new circumstances than when the loan
was offered. As the Supreme Court itself announced when embracing its formula
in Till, the initial contract interest rate no longer provides useful information to the
bankruptcy judge.
We thus conclude that the interest rate operated as a largely irrelevant, but still
influential anchor. The expertise that bankruptcy judges bring to the assessment of
5

The original materials presented to the judges are available from the first author.
Six judges in the no anchor condition and two judges in the anchor condition did
not answer the question. One judge in the anchor condition provided an interest rate
below the prime rate (3.5%). This judge was excluded from the analysis.
7 With the judge who provided 3.5% entered into the analysis, the mean in the anchor condition was 7.05, and the difference remained marginally significant. t(102) =
1.68, p = 0.095.
6
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interest rates did not insulate them from the effects of anchoring, even though it
should not have influenced them.
3.2 Framing Effects
People treat decisions that involve potential gains from the status quo differently
from decisions that involve potential losses (KAHNEMAN AND TVERSKY [1984]
and [1979]; TVERSKY AND KAHNEMAN [1981] and [1986]). Psychologists call this
the framing effect. The character of a decision as involving a gain or a loss affects
peoples’ willingness to incur risk. People tend to make risk-averse decisions when
choosing between options that appear to represent gains and risk-seeking decisions
when choosing between options that appear to represent losses (KAHNEMAN AND
TVERSKY [1984] and [1979]; TVERSKY AND KAHNEMAN [1981] and [1986]). For
example, most people prefer a certain $100 gain to a 50% chance of winning $200
but prefer a 50% chance of losing $200 to a certain $100 loss (TVERSKY AND
KAHNEMAN [1992]).
Bankruptcy judges constantly make decisions involving risk. Anytime they decide
to allow a business to continue operating, they are risking imposing losses on the
creditors that are greater than those that immediate liquidation of the business would
impose. This decision can be characterized as one involving gains or losses to the
creditors. It can be characterized as involving gains in the sense that if a going
concern is liquidated in bankruptcy, the creditors get some of their money now, as
opposed to gambling that keeping the concern going will bring them greater returns.
It can also be characterized as involving losses in the sense that if a going concern is
liquidated in bankruptcy, the creditors lose some of the money that they were owed,
as opposed to gambling that the keeping the concern going will allow them to avoid
incurring some of these losses.
Because this gamble primarily affects the creditors and not the judge, one might
think that the decision frame would not affect bankruptcy judges. Nevertheless,
in our earlier research, we have found that frames influence judges in civil litigation, which also does not require judges to gamble with their own money.
Hence, if the bankruptcy judges, like the other judges we have studied, are affected by frame, then the somewhat arbitrary characterization of a liquidation decision as involving gains or losses might affect bankruptcy judges as well. Given
their experience, however, bankruptcy judges might have developed ways of thinking about the liquidation decisions that are not affected by how the decisions are
characterized.
Our materials test for the effect of decision frame by presenting the judges with
a hypothetical decision either to liquidate a business debtor or to allow the debtor to
remain operating. We provided some details of the business and the reasons for its
bankruptcy filing. The important detail here was that the company held $600,000
less in assets than debts. We then presented the judges with a choice of immediate
liquidation of the company (which would bring the creditors $600,000 less than they
were owed) or allowing it to continue as an ongoing concern (which held out the

174

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and Andrew J. Wistrich

JITE 163

prospect of paying the debts in full). We altered the frame of the choices as follows.
Judges in the “gain” condition saw the two options described as follows:
“Which plan would you choose?
__ If you select Plan A, $200,000 of the unsecured debt will be paid for sure.
__ If you select Plan B, there is a 1/3 probability that all of the unsecured debt will
be paid and a 2/3 chance that none of it will be paid.”
Judges in the “loss” condition see the two options described as follows:
“__ If you select Plan A, $400,000 of the unsecured debt will remain unpaid for
sure.
__ If you select Plan B, there is a 1/3 probability that none of the unsecured debt will
remain unpaid and a 2/3 probability that all of the unsecured debt will remain
unpaid.”
Both versions of the choice are, in fact, economically identical.8 In the gain frame,
Plan A will give the creditors 1/3 of what they are owed with certainty, while Plan
B will give them a 1/3 chance of recovering all of their debt. The same is true of the
plans described from the loss perspective, except that these versions emphasize the
unsecured debt that will not be recovered. Other than in the call of the question, the
two versions did not vary.
The results varied by frame. Among the judges evaluating the choice of plans in
the gain frame, 91.8% (45 out of 49) preferred the plan that would pay one third of the
secured debt for sure. Among judges evaluating the choice of plans in the loss frame,
73.3% (44 out of 60) preferred the less plan that involved certain payment. In both
instances, the judges favored the certain plan, but the frame shifted the preference by
18.5 percentage points towards the riskier plan – which was a statistically significant
difference (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.014). In effect, more judges were willing to
incur the risks of Plan B when the materials identified the choices as involving the
loss of unsecured debt rather than the recovery of unsecured debt.
The problem we relied upon, much like the original Asian Disease problem on
which it is based, might be explained without reliance on the concept of decision
frame. The judges could have interpreted the certain plans as reflecting the minimum
number of gains or losses, depending upon frame. Under this account, in the gain
frame, the judges might have interpreted the phrase “$200,000 of the unsecured debt
will be paid for sure” as meaning “at least $200,000” will be paid; judges in the loss
frame could similarly have interpreted “$400,000 of the unsecured debt will remain
unpaid for sure” as meaning that “at least $400,000” will remain unpaid. If so, in
the gain frame, Plan A would seem to be more valuable than it would appear in the
loss frame. A similar account of the Asian Disease problem has been offered by at
least one researcher (MANDEL [2001]). Our data cannot rule out this possibility, but
8 The choices are based roughly on the well known (and often criticized) “Asian
disease” problem first reported by KAHNEMAN AND TVERSKY [1984].
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this account of the Asian Disease problem upon which we relied remains a subject
of controversy among psychologists.
3.3 Omission Bias
People generally assess actions differently than omissions. When an action causes
harm, people are more apt to blame the actor than when the actor has simply failed to
undertake some action that prevents harm (SPRANCE, MINSK, AND BARON [1991]).
This difference occurs even when the act is similarly to the actor than an omission.
Actions are more easily mentally undone than omissions, and produce more regret
than the failure to act. Actions also produce a greater attribution of responsibility than
omissions. This phenomenon might underlie many parents’ reluctance to vaccinate
their children, which confers benefits, but also a small risk of harm (RITOV AND
BARON [1990]). In one study of the omission bias, for example, individuals stated
that they would be unwilling to undertake a vaccine that posed a 9% risk of illness,
even when doing so would alleviate a 10% risk of contracting the very same disease
(CHAPMAN [2004]).
To test whether bankruptcy judges also are sensitive to the distinction between
acts and omissions, we created a problem in which the judges assess an individual
debtor who might have avoided filing for bankruptcy either because of an act or an
omission. The hypothetical described an elderly debtor who filed for bankruptcy
after falling deeply into debt on his credit card. The materials noted that he might
have avoided bankruptcy, as he had inherited a notable sum of money from his
brother. He had badly managed the inheritance, however, and had lost it all. Half
of the judges read that this inheritance consisted of stock in a mid-sized company that he had neglected to convert into a safe investment (an “omission”); the
other half of the judges read that the debtor had inherited U.S. Treasury notes, but
that he had converted them into stock in a mid-sized company (a “commission”).
In both cases, the materials indicated that shortly afterwards, the stock became
worthless.
The materials ask the judges to rule on the debtor’s petition to discharge his
credit-card debt. Although bankruptcy proceedings (at the time) ordinarily allow
a debtor a fresh start, free from unsecured debt, Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the
bankruptcy code precludes the dissolution of such debt under circumstances in
which absolution would constitute fraud. A debtor who knows that the he is incurring debt that he cannot pay is not to be absolved of such debt in bankruptcy.
The materials asked, “based solely on the facts above, would you discharge [the
debtor’s] credit card debt?” They present six choices below this, ranging from:
“Very likely to discharge”; “Likely to discharge”; “Somewhat likely to discharge”;
“Somewhat unlikely to discharge”; “Unlikely to discharge”; “Very unlikely to
discharge”.
As Table 1, below, shows, the omission/commission distinction had no effect on
the judges in our study. An ordered logit analysis revealed that the condition had no
effect on the judge’s choices ( Z = 0.48, p = 0.63).
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Table 1
% Choosing Each Option in the Omission/Commission Problem

Condition

Very
Likely
Somewhat Somewhat Unlikely
Very
likely
to discharge likely
unlikely
to discharge unlikely
to discharge
to discharge to discharge
to discharge

Omission
(n = 52)

63.5

21.2

7.7

1.9

5.8

0.0

Commission
(n = 61)

63.9

31.2

3.3

1.6

0.0

0.0

To be sure, these materials provided a somewhat indirect test of the influence
of the omission bias. We did not ask the judges to assess the culpability of the act
or omission that dissipated the debtor’s savings. Rather, we asked them to assess
the state of mind of the debtor when he incurred the credit-card debt. Here, the
omission or commission does not speak to that state of mind, but to the causes
of the bankruptcy itself. Hence, the omission bias might well have affected how
judges assign blame for the debtor’s insolvency, but would not necessarily affect the
judges’ thinking about the nature of the debt itself.
Nevertheless, we think that if the omission bias plays a role in judges’ thinking, it
should have played a role in this hypothetical. Indeed, we designed this hypothetical
precisely to test the possibility of an indirect, and hence more arbitrary, influence of
the bias. In applying the broad mandate against fraud, we suspect that bankruptcy
judges are influenced by the culpability of the debtor. To the extent that they blamed
the debtor for his situation, we believe that they would have treated the debtor
differently. Our results cannot, of course, definitively rule out the role that the
omission bias might play in how bankruptcy judges make decisions, but the results
suggest that its influence might not extend to contexts in which it plays only an
indirect role.
3.4 Race
We also tested for the effects of the race of the debtor on the decisions of bankruptcy
judges. Race clearly should have little effect on the kinds of decision any judge
makes. The legal system in the United States is deeply imbued with a sense of equal
protection that is wholly inconsistent with the concept that people should be treated
differently because of their skin color. Race represents an influence judge simply
must resist. Nevertheless, a handful of studies provide some fairly direct evidence
of the influence of race on the decisions of judges. Race has been found to affect
judges’ bail setting-decisions (AYRES [2003, pp. 233–273]) and their sentencing
decisions (MUSTARD [2001]).
We crafted materials to assess the role that race of the debtor might play in
discretionary discharge decisions that bankruptcy judges make. Mindful of the
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potential that judges might react to our efforts to study race, we adopted the research
methods used in a recent study of the effect of race on employment decisions by
BERTRAND AND MULLAINATHAN [2004]. These researchers devised fake resumes
that they sent to real employers who had posted want ads in local newspapers.
The resumes varied the name of the applicant, using names that people generally
think of as African-American names and names that people do not think of as
African-American names. Employers were much less likely to call applicants with
African-American-sounding names on the applicant’s resume. The availability of
these names, proven to produce disparities in other contexts, allowed us to alter the
race of the debtor in our scenarios without simply identifying their race.
The hypothetical itself provided a story of a woman seeking to have student-loan
debt discharged in bankruptcy. The materials described a woman who dropped out
of college after three years due to an unplanned pregnancy. She incurred sizeable
student-loan debts that she was seeking to have discharged. In the U.S. Bankruptcy
system, a bankruptcy judge can only discharge student loans if: (1) the debtor cannot
maintain a minimal standard of living for herself and her dependents if required to
repay the loan; (2) additional circumstances exist suggesting this is likely to remain
the case throughout a significant portion of the repayment period; and (3) the debtor
has made good faith efforts to repay the loan.9 The materials then asked what portion,
if any, of the debtor’s student loan the judges would discharge. (The problem also
asked judges to assume that they had the option of partly discharging educational
loan debt even though the issue of whether partial discharge is available or not is
a matter of some dispute.) The materials asked, “Based on the ‘undue hardship’ test
enunciated above and the facts as given, what dollar amount of Student’s loan amount
would you discharge (please pick a dollar amount between $0 and $83,748)?”
The race of the debtor did not affect the judges. The judges who assessed the
debtors with African-American names discharged a mean of $47,106 (or 56.2%)
while the judges who assessed the debtors with white names discharged a mean of
$48,506 (or 57.9%). This difference was not significant (t(106) = 0.24, p = 0.81).
3.5 Apologies and Terror Management
The last problem was designed to address two different psychological phenomena:
the role of apologies and the role of what psychologists call terror management. Both
reflect potential emotional influences that might distract the judges from focusing
on the application of the bankruptcy laws to individual debtors.
Apologies doubtless play an important role in the litigation process. Anecdotally,
many aggrieved civil litigants report seeking contrition from parties they feel have
wronged them, at least as much as they seek compensation. “Victims desire an
apology” (O’HARA AND YARN [2002, p. 1122]). Many states, in fact, have adopted
9 The materials cite several cases as support: Brunner v. New York State Higher
Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2nd Cir. 1987); accord, Educational Credit
Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004); In re Gerhardt, 348
F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003).
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statutes that shield apologies from admissibility in civil cases, so as to encourage
litigants to say they are sorry (O’HARA AND YARN [2002]). In criminal cases,
so important are expressions of sorrow and remorse that they reduce a criminal
sentence (U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 3.E [2005]). Similarly,
jurors who have served in capital cases report that a belief that the defendant
is truly remorseful is second only to the future dangerousness of the defendant in
influencing their decision as to whether to sentence the defendant to death (GARVEY,
EISENBERG , AND WELLS [1988]).
Experimental research on apologies confirms the view that apologies matter in
litigation. Professor Jennifer Robbenolt has conducted a series of studies in which
people assess the value of apologies in hypothetical cases (ROBBENOLT [2003]). Her
work reveals that apologies facilitate settlement. Aggrieved plaintiffs who receive
a sincere apology are more likely to accept a settlement and are willing to settle for
less than plaintiffs who do not receive such an apology. The form of the apology,
however, is important. A defendant who only expresses sorrow for a plaintiff’s injury
does not benefit from the apology. A defendant must also accept responsibility and
expresses remorse for their actions for the apology to be successful.
Terror management refers to the idea that contemplating mortality affects how
people think (GREENBERG , SOLOMON, AND PYSZCZYNSKI [1997]). Indeed, it is
also referred to as “mortality salience.” People contemplating their own mortality
make decisions that reflect an effort to counteract the transience of their corporeal
being. They endorse deeply held beliefs they share with many others or express
greater reverence for enduring cultural attitudes or symbols. For example, United
States citizens express more support for American policies when quizzed in front of
a funeral home than in front of more neutral locations (GREENBERG , SOLOMON, AND
PYSZCZYNSKI [1997]). Writing essays about death (as opposed to neutral topics)
also induces people to express greater esteem for their country, their religion, and
their ethnic group (GREENBERG , SOLOMON, AND PYSZCZYNSKI [1997]).
Terror management has been shown to affect judges. In one study, researchers
asked a group of municipal court judges to write a brief essay describing either
a neutral topic or their own death (ROSENBLATT et al. [1989]). Both groups were
then asked to review a criminal case against a prostitute and set bail. The group
that wrote about death set bail at an average of $450, while the group that wrote
about a neutral topic set bail at an average of $50. Although this is the only study of
judges, a whole range of studies demonstrate a diverse array of effects that thinking
about one’s mortality can have on judgments involving the legal system (see ARNDT
et al. [2005]).
Assessing the effects of terror management on the legal system can be complex.
Thinking about death leads people to embrace cherished cultural attitudes and
icons – things that would seem likely to last beyond one’s own life. For judges,
this might produce a conflict of sorts. Consider, for example, a judge who faces
a suppression hearing involving inculpatory evidence against a vicious criminal
defendant. Terror management suggests that the judge might become more punitive
so as to affirm the fundamental rules governing a stable society; this might lead
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a judge to be more willing to admit the evidence rather than let the transgressor go
free. On the other hand, if the evidence was obtained in violation of a judge’s deeply
held constitutional values, then the judge might affirm his or her world views by
suppressing the evidence, even at the expense of letting the transgressor go free.
Terror management theory predicts only that a person will embrace a deeply held
value, but does not predict which value predominates among competing principles.
We designed a hypothetical question to test both the effects of apologies and of
terror management. The question mimicked the materials we used to test the omission bias in that we depicted a debtor seeking to have credit-card debt discharged.
As noted above, the debt can be discharged if it was not accumulated with the
knowledge that it could not be repaid. In our problem, the debtor incurred the debt
from taking a lavish vacation that caused his employer to discharge him. His subsequent unemployment made it impossible for him to repay the debt. The materials
presented the judges with many details, including the nature of the debtor’s former
employment. They ended by asking the judges whether they would discharge the
debt, and include the same six-item checklist (ranging from “Very likely to discharge” to “Very unlikely to discharge”) as we used in the problem testing for the
omission bias.
We varied the problem to test for the effect of both apologies and terror management. Half of the judges simply assessed the problem as stated above. The other half
read a version that included a sincere apology by the debtor for incurring the debt.
To test the terror management hypothesis, we varied the type of job that the debtor
had secured. For half of the judges, the materials identified his job as a bus boy for
a pizza restaurant and for the other half of the judges, the materials identified his
job as a gravedigger for a local mortuary. In effect, we employed a 2x2 design, such
that one quarter of the judges evaluated an unemployed bus boy, another quarter
evaluated an unemployed bus boy that had apologized, another quarter evaluated an
unemployed gravedigger, and the last quarter evaluated an unemployed gravedigger
who had apologized.
We had no prior theory as to whether the apology would interact in any way with
our terror management manipulation. We know of no study that suggests that it
would. Our intent here was simply to use this hypothetical as a vehicle for studying
multiple phenomena.
As Table 2a, below, shows, the apology had little effect on the judges. An ordered
logit analysis showed that the judges who saw the apology did not make significantly
different choices than judges who did not ( Z = 0.50, p = 0.615).
As Table 2b, below, shows, our effort to invoke terror management had no effect
on the judges’ choices either. An ordered logit analysis showed that the debtor’s job
did not significantly affect the judges ( Z = 0.14, p = 0.887).
The results on apologies are particularly striking. We used the type of apology that
is supposed to have the greatest effect; the apologist expresses personal responsibility
and regret for his own actions. Several factors might account for the lack of a finding
here. First, although we have no hard data, we think it is extremely unusual for
a bankruptcy judge to encounter a debtor who apologies. Indeed, individual debtors
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Table 2a
% Choosing Each Option in the Apology Problem

Condition
No apology
(n = 54)
Apology
(n = 57)

Very
Likely
Somewhat Somewhat Unlikely
Very
likely
to discharge likely
unlikely
to discharge unlikely
to discharge
to discharge to discharge
to discharge
13.0

5.6

5.6

11.1

24.1

40.7

7.0

8.8

8.8

15.8

26.3

33.3

Table 2b
% Choosing Each Option in the Terror Management Problem

Condition
Pizza parlor
(n = 60)
Funeral parlor
(n = 51)

Very
Likely
Somewhat Somewhat Unlikely
Very
likely
to discharge likely
unlikely
to discharge unlikely
to discharge
to discharge to discharge
to discharge
10.0

8.3

6.7

13.3

25.0

36.7

9.8

5.9

7.8

13.7

25.5

37.3

rarely even appear before bankruptcy judges. The apology here might have seemed
so anomalous that the judges simply had no sensible way of assessing its worth.
Second, bankruptcy judges might be a bit jaded about debtors. After processing
thousands of cases of financial ruin each year, bankruptcy judges might come to
think that fiscal irresponsibility is rampant. An apology from a debtor, even if
unusual, might simply ring hollow. Third, it is important to note that the apology
was directed at the judge, and not the debtor. The previous research on apologies
shows that apologies are effective when directed at the injured party. Here, the judges
have not been adversely affected by the debtor’s conduct. One might nevertheless
have expected that a serious act of contrition would improve the judge’s assessment
of the moral standing of the debtor, which in turn might have produced a more
lenient view of the debtor’s situation. But the data say otherwise.
As to terror management, our results present a clear failure to replicate an alreadyestablished phenomenon. The work by Rosenblatt and his colleagues (ROSENBLATT
et al. [1989]) showed that judges forced to contemplate their mortality produced
radically different decisions than judges induced to think about their dining habits.
And yet, we found no such effect. It is possible that we did not make their mortality salient enough. After all, Rosenblatt and his colleagues asked judges to write
an essay on death. We thus did not force the judges to grapple with mortality the
way Rosenblatt and his colleagues did. Still, as noted above, other studies of terror
management uncover effects merely by insuring that an interviewee is facing a fu-

(2007)

Heuristics and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges

181

neral home. Perhaps punishing debtors might not constitute an action that enhances
self-esteem in the face of one’s mortality. Forgiveness of debtors, after all, is a fundamental part of most religions. Our data suggest that at least in the bankruptcy
context, a minimal manipulation of mortality salience is not enough to alter judges’
decision making.
Both the effect of apologies and of terror management might constitute undesirable emotion influences on the bankruptcy system. The outcome of a bankruptcy
hearing should not really depend on whether the judge just returned from a funeral.
And unless Congress amends the bankruptcy code to include specific provisions
allowing judges to be more lenient on debtors who accept responsibility for their
debts (as the federal sentencing guidelines do in the criminal context), apologies
should play no role in the outcome of bankruptcy hearings either. In this context, at
least, the judges effectuated the stated goals of the bankruptcy system, uncluttered
by these emotional effects.

4 Further Analysis: Politics, Comparisons, and Conclusions
The results present a somewhat murky answer to the question of whether specialization allows judges learn to rely on helpful, rather than misleading, heuristics. Both
anchoring and framing adversely affected the bankruptcy judges, but the judges
resisted the omission bias, the effects of race, and the emotional influences of apologies and mortality salience. In this section, we present a comparison of these results
to a similar assessment of generalist judges, we discuss the influence of political
attitudes on these judges, and we offer some brief conclusions.
4.1 Specialists versus Generalists
We have used similar methods to study the effects of heuristics in generalist
judges, thereby facilitating a rough comparison. In one of our previous studies, we assessed the effects of anchoring and framing (among other phenomena) on a group of 167 federal magistrate judges. Federal magistrate judges and
bankruptcy judges are quite similar in that before they become judges they are
experienced lawyers. Both types of judges are also appointed to their positions
by a merit-selection process for fixed terms. Federal magistrate judges, however,
preside over a whole range of disputes. Furthermore, most of the bankruptcy
judges come to the bench as specialized attorneys, having had prior experience
as bankruptcy attorneys (MABEY [2005, p. 107]). The magistrates, by contrast,
generally join the bench after long careers as prosecutors, criminal-defense attorneys, or attorneys engaged in general civil litigation. Hence, their principal
differences are that the bankruptcy judges are specialists and the magistrates are
generalists.
In our previous study, we found that irrelevant anchors influenced magistrate’s
assessments of pain and suffering damages (GUTHRIE , RACHLINSKI , AND WISTRICH
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[2001]). Among magistrates, the introduction of an extremely low anchor reduced
damage awards by 0.41 standard deviations.10 In the present study of bankruptcy
judges, the anchor increased the interest rate by 0.37 standard deviations. The effect
here was thus nearly identical to that which we observed in the magistrate judges.
The framing effect we observed among bankruptcy judges was also similar to
that which we observed in our study of magistrate judges’ assessments of settlements in civil lawsuits. In the study by GUTHRIE , RACHLINSKI, AND WISTRICH
[2001], the variation by frame from gains to losses shifted the judges’ preferences by 15 percentage points (40 percent favored the certain option in the gain
frame and 25 percent favored the certain option in the loss frame). In the present
study of bankruptcy judges, by contrast, the shift of frames altered choices by
18.5 percentage points (91.8 percent favored the certain option in the gain frame
and 73.3 percent favored the certain option in the loss frame). Once again, the effect
is similar.
We note that, as described above, previous work has shown other generalist judges
to be vulnerable to the effects of race and of terror management (ROSENBLATT et al.
[1989]). Rosenblatt and colleagues’ study of terror management was also notably
similar to our own work (unlike the field research that produced the differences by
race of defendant), and hence provides some modest sense that bankruptcy judges
may be more resistant to this untoward influence than generalist judges.
Another related piece of the evidence related to the potential superiority of
specialized judges is that we consistently found that more experienced judges
were neither more nor less vulnerable to the psychological influences we studied.
(We did not report the detailed statistical analysis of this in this paper, but we
failed to find such a trend for any of the phenomena that we studied.) This result also undermines the thesis that specialized experience produces better decision making. That experience did not mollify the effects of anchors or frames
suggests that the judges do not become more resistant to cognitive error over
time. Furthermore, the younger judges were no less resistant to misleading influences of omission, race, apology, or terror management than their senior colleagues. If specialization facilitates the development of superior heuristics, then we
should have observed a relationship between experience and the rate of cognitive
error.
Thus, overall, these results do not suggest that specialization has much, if any
effect on judges’ propensity to rely on misleading heuristics. To be sure, the comparisons are clumsy in that we did not use precisely the same materials. And we
found no effect of terror management in bankruptcy judges, even though other
research has uncovered large effects in generalist judges. But overall, our study
cannot be said to support the idea that experience produces better ways of judging
cases.
10 Note, this was calculated by the difference in the mean of the log of the damage
award in each condition by the standard deviation of the log of the awards observed in
GUTHRIE, RACHLINSKI, AND WISTRICH [2001]. Using the raw data would not be appropriate for this calculation because the data were positively skewed.
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4.2 Political Influences
In our study of bankruptcy judges the judge’s political orientation affected their judgment, as shown in Table 3, below. Republican judges made decisions that favored
creditors more than their Democratic counterparts. Republican judges set higher
interest rates for the individual debtor in the anchoring hypothetical and discharged
less of the student loan in the race problem. They were also less sympathetic to the
omission bias problem, although this trend was not significant. We did not observe
any difference on the apology/terror problem, and the framing problem presents
options that cannot be said to reflect any preferences for debtors or creditors. Even
though the sample size was small (owing to the scant number of Republicans in
our sample), we observed one significant difference and one marginally significant
difference.
Table 3
Comparison of Republican and Democratic Judges in Our Study
Anchoring
Study:
Mean
Interest Rate

Race Study:
Mean Amount of
Loan Discharged

Omission Bias:
Likelihood of
Discharge
(on a 6-point scale;
higher means
less likely)

Apology:
Likelihood of
Discharge
(on a 6-point scale;
higher means
less likely)

7.40

$34,323

1.76

4.42

6.49

$50,972

1.44

4.42

t(97) = 1.75
p = 0.08

t(100) = 2.41
p = 0.02

t(97) = 1.29
p = 0.21

t(103) = 0.01
p = 0.99

Party
Republican
(n = 25)
Democratic
(n = 82)
(statistical test
for difference)

The results on political party are perhaps less than surprising. The Republican Party,
more so than the Democratic Party, claims to emphasize personal responsibility
above governmental paternalism. In this fact pattern owning up to one’s debts might
be more consistent with Republican attitudes than Democratic ones.
This finding is at odds with much of our other work in which we generally do not
find differences between judges of different political parties. It is also not consistent
with data on juries that indicates that general attitudes (such as orientation towards
a particular political party) do not often predict jury verdicts.11 But research on
juries also shows that more specific attitudes can predict verdicts. It is possible that
service as a bankruptcy judges, unlike service as a general civil or criminal judge,
taps closely into the attitudes associated with the two major political parties in the
United States.
11

See HANS AND VIDMAR [1986].
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This possibility raises a serious downside for the expansion of specialized judges.
These results suggest that it may be easier for an appointing authority to predict the
decisions of specialized judges than generalized judges. Whereas a generalist judge
might hold an array of attitudes, only some of which might be consistent with the
desires of the entity that appoints generalists judges, specialist judges only decide
a narrow range of cases, and hence might be more predictable. Greater specialization
thus risks greater politicization of the judiciary.
4.3 Conclusion
In our study, bankruptcy judges resisted the effects of the omission bias, were
unaffected by the race of the debtors, were indifferent to a debtor’s apology, and
were not affected by a transient emphasis on their own mortality. We think this
is all good news. We do not think that these factors should have had any effect
on judges. They were all distractions that have been found to affect ordinary decision makers, and these judges resisted them. At the same time, however, the
judges relied on the irrelevant anchor and were influenced by framing. Furthermore,
we found no evidence that specialization had any beneficial effect on the judges’
judgment.
Our study can be only a small part of any serious debate on the use of specialist
judges. Our study presents no evidence that specialization allows judges to develop
better cognitive skills. Specialists might still know the law better than generalists can
and might present other advantages. Our study suggests no real cognitive advantages
for specialized judges, and raises the unexpected downside, however, that specialty
can facilitate greater political control over the judicial process.
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